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Shall we dance? Welfarist incorporation and the politics of state-labour NGO relations in 
China  
Jude Howell, accepted manuscript, The China Quarterly 2015 
ABSTRACT 
State-labour NGOs relations in China have been particularly fraught. In 2012 these took an 
interesting twist, as some local governments made overtures to labour NGOs to co-operate in 
providing services to migrant workers. This article argues that this shift is part of a broader 
strategy of `welfarist incorporation’ to redraw the social contract between state and labour. 
There are two key elements to this: first, relaxation of the registration regulations for social 
organisations; second,  governmental purchasing of services from social organisations. These 
overtures have both a state and market logic to maintain social control and stabilise relations 
of production.  
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SHALL WE DANCE? WELFARIST INCORPORATION AND THE POLITICS OF 
STATE-LABOUR NGO RELATIONS  
by Jude Howell, LSE (accepted manuscript for publication in The China Quarterly, 2015) 
During the Hu-Wen period labour non-governmental organisations (NGOs) mushroomed 
across China, providing services to injured workers, legal advice to migrant workers, 
advocating labour rights and in some cases pursuing ideological goals of class struggle. 
Operating in a politically sensitive field, labour NGOs have been periodically subject to 
repression by local public security organs, particularly those that adopt a rights-based or 
ideological approach and/or are funded by external agencies. At other times, however, some 
local governments have tolerated their existence, casting a blind eye to their activism and 
only occasionally firing words of caution. In 2012 the tale of state-labour NGO relations took 
an interesting twist, as local governments and trades union branches in Beijing, Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou, made overtures to labour NGOs to co-operate in providing services to migrant 
workers, backing their advances with promises of state funding. This marked an important 
strategic shift in the state’s approach to the previous cyclical pattern of heavy-handed state 
repression or muted state tolerance.  How then can we explain this shift in state strategy 
towards selected labour NGOs?  
This paper argues that these concerted overtures implemented by local states in Shenzhen, 
Guangdong and Beijing with the backing of central government, are part of a broader strategy 
of `welfarist incorporation’ aimed at redrawing the social contract between state and labour, 
and more generally state and citizens. There are two key elements to this strategy. The first 
involves widening the pool of registered social organisations to assist with welfare provision. 
Though the corporatist features of the regulatory framework governing social organisations 
remain nominally intact, in practice welfarist incorporation has required an experimental 
relaxation of registration rules. The second is governmental purchasing of services (goumai 
fuwu购买服务) from social organisations. As the simultaneous repression of labour NGOs in 
Guangdong province in 2012 demonstrates, welfarist incorporation does not herald the end of 
repression. Ultimately, these overtures mark a strategic move by the Party-state facing an 
increasingly conflict-riven and differentiated society to maintain social control, stabilise 
capitalist relations of production and sustain the power and authority of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).  They have thus both a state and market logic.  
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The paper begins by introducing the concept of welfarist incorporation which refers here to `a 
political and economic arrangement between the state and organised society, whereby the 
state invites selected civic organisations to assist in the implementation of welfare policy’. It 
distinguishes welfarist incorporation from corporatism and elucidates how it signals the 
crafting of a new social contract. The second section provides an overview of the rocky 
development of state-labour NGO relations since the early 1990s and the ambiguous nature 
of state-labour NGO interactions. The third part traces state moves to `dance with labour 
NGOs’ and examines the varied responses of the Guangdong local state and labour NGOs to 
this new strategic direction. Finally, it considers the implications of this strategy for future 
governance and crafting a new social contract based on welfare without organised politics.  
In this paper the term `labour NGOs’ refers to those NGOs that orient all or part of their goals 
and activities towards addressing labour issues such as work injury, conditions of 
employment, labour rights, and worker educationi. They may or may not be registered 
(though most are unregistered)ii and vary in terms of goals, origins, size, funding, capacity, 
functions, and degree of independence from state and market. As elsewhere, labour NGOs in 
China tend to relatively small and task-oriented, and do not seek mass membership.iii. 
Though the term `NGO’ conjures up an image of a legally registered entity with salaried 
professional staffiv, in China with the tight registration regulations, it refers to a looser array 
of organisations that may or may not be legally registered, independent of governmentv, and 
may or may not have professional, salaried staff and volunteers. The paper focuses on labour 
NGOs because they lie at the precarious edge of state-civil society boundaries in China, 
where, like other organisations deemed suspect by the Party-state, they are subject to frequent 
harassment. Observing organisations at this boundary allows us to fathom the politics 
underlying shifts in governance strategies towards labour organising in particular and towards 
civil society more generally.  
                                                          
i Ford 2006. 
ii He (2008: 9) refers to two labour NGOs in the Pearl River Delta that were able to register in 2007.  
iii Ford, 2006:177. 
iv Ahmed and Potter 2006. 
v Though the term NGO suggests autonomy from the state, in practice civil society groups in China range  from 
close-co-operation to deliberate distancing from the state. Whilst most registered NGOs are quasi-state, 
quasi civil society-type organisations, the proliferation of unregistered groups since 2000 far outnumbers 
registered groups, suggesting a more complex civil society landscape. 
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The paper draws on 85 semi-structured interviews research conducted with founders and staff 
of Chinese labour NGOs, Hong Kong labour NGOs, university legal clinics, academics and 
trade union officials in Beijing, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Suzhou, Chongqging, Guangdong, Hong 
Kong between 2010 and 2014. Altogether 32 labour NGOs were interviewedvi (8 more than 
once) and 8 Hong Kong labour NGOsvii. Apart from semi-structured interviews the research 
is also based upon newspaper articles, grey literature published by NGOs, and academic 
publicationsviii.  
I. WELFARIST INCORPORATION AND CRAFTING A NEW SOCIAL 
CONTRACT  
Several scholars have drawn on the concept of corporatism to understand the state’s role in 
shaping associational life in China. Schmitter (1979:93) defined corporatism as follows:  
“Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-
competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or 
licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate monopoly within their respective 
categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports”.  
In deploying the concept of corporatism, scholars often counterposed this to civil societyix. It 
is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into this debatex. Suffice it to say that both 
approaches to explicating state-society relations have enriched the field of study, but also 
proven inadequate in capturing adequately the changing nature of these relations. The term 
welfarist incorporation provides an alternative concept for understanding the subtle shifts in 
state strategy towards civil society in China since the late Hu-Wen period.  
                                                          
vi Seven of these were interviewed more than once. 
vii I am very grateful to Professor Zhao Wei and research assistants for the labour NGO interviews conducted in 
Chongqing, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces.  
viii I am grateful for comments of participants on a presentation of this paper at a seminar at the Australian 
National University (ANU) in September 2014, to the ANU for hosting this visit and also to the Fairbank 
Centre, Harvard for providing an intellectual environment for data analysis and writing. 
ix Unger and Chan 1995a, b; Pearson 1994; Lee 1991; Dickson 2000; Unger 2008; Howell 2012; White et all 
1996. 
x For a fuller discussion see Howell 2012 and Yep 2000. 
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Welfarist incorporation refers to `a political and economic arrangement between the state and 
organised society, whereby selected civic organisations are invited by the state to assist in the 
implementation of policy’. It is distinct from the idea of corporatism as first elaborated in 
Schmitter’s work in several respects. First, whilst classic corporatism a la Schmitter focuses 
on peak organisations brought into policy-making, welfarist incorporation is limited to 
processes of implementation. Second, unlike classic corporatism, it is not about the 
representation of interests, such as the working class, but rather about the servicing of 
interests. Third, whilst corporatism emphasises the compulsory and non-competitive nature of 
selected organisations, welfarist incorporation sets up a competitive process for selecting a 
plurality of civic organisations to deliver servicesxi. As with all ideal-types actually existing 
welfarist incorporation may vary empirically in different political contexts.  
Welfarist incorporation forms part of a broader strategy to revise the social contract between 
the state and workers in China. The transition towards a market economy from 1978 onwards 
heralded the gradual collapse of the social contract forged between workers and the state 
during the Maoist decades. Employment in a state enterprise was highly coveted as it offered 
cradle-to-grave social security, considerable welfare benefits varying with the size and wealth 
of the enterprise, permanent or temporary worker, in return for worker quiescencexii. At the 
ideological level workers were proclaimed `masters of the enterprise’ at the top of the 
communist, socio-political hierarchy.  
Experimentation with foreign investment in the Special Economic Zones in the 1980s paved 
the way for the gradual commodification and casualization of labour, as workers became 
employed on time-bound contracts and rewarded according to productivityxiii. The extension 
of these conditions to all urban workers coupled with accelerated state enterprise reform from 
the mid-1990s led to the `smashing of the iron rice bowl’ and the subsequent decline of the 
`work-unit’ (danwei单位) as a site of reproduction and social controlxiv. By the late 1980s 
workers were already expressing dissatisfaction with the new employment terms through 
                                                          
xi This reflects similar  neo-liberal processes of sub-contracting to NGOs elsewhere. See Kamat 2004, Howell 
and Pearce 2001, Robinson 1997.  
xii Takahara 1987; Walder 1986; White 1987. 
xiii Crane, 1990; Howell, 1993; Takahara 1992; Friedman and Lee, 2010 
xiv Tomba 2006 
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attacks on managersxv, strikesxvi, passive resistance to wage reforms and voting with their 
feetxvii. Party leaders became increasingly concerned about increasing unrest both in rural 
areas and in China’s export-oriented coastal belt. To appease labour the Party-state began to 
fashion a new social contract that would guarantee worker quiescence in return for legal 
protection of rights, a more effective trade union and social welfare.  
There were three elements to this revision of China’s social contract: first, the introduction of 
protective labour legislation such as the 1994 Labour Law, 2007 Employment Promotion 
Law, 2008 Labour Contract Law, 2010 Social Insurance Law; second, central government 
pressure on the ACFTU to become more effective in averting conflict by establishing 
grassroots unions in private enterprises, absorbing migrant workers, developing legal 
capacities and establishing collective consultation (Chen 2004; Howell, 20008; Pringle and 
Clarke 2011; Taylor et al 2003); and third, the creation of a social welfare system to fill the 
vacuum left with the disintegration of the work-unit. It is this third dimension which forms 
the main focus of this article and within which we position the state’s invitation to labour 
NGOs to dance.  
With the acceleration of state enterprise reform from 1994 onwards and subsequent labour 
unrest, the Party/state began to cast its attention to reforming the welfare system. During the 
Jiang Zemin period there were patchwork efforts to experiment with developing insurance 
systems for medical, social security and pensions provision for urban citizensxviii. However, 
welfare reform proceeded in piecemeal fashion during the 1990s, with considerable variation 
and regional fragmentation.  
It was during the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao period (2002-2012), when the political discourse 
shifted to people-centred development and harmonious society that a more systematic effort 
was made to address welfare. This entailed creating policy and regulatory frameworks for 
private for-profit and not-for-profit welfare providers, reforming community-level 
institutions, and cultivating a cadre of professional social workers. Together these reforms 
                                                          
xv Sheehan, 198: 209 
xvi Wilson, 1990:59 
xvi Leung 1988:156-171 
xvi Howell, 1993: 234 
xvii Howell, 1993: 213, 223. 
xviii Chan et al 2008. 
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were captured in the new-fangled slogans of `social management’ and `social construction’ 
that were introduced in the fourth and sixth Plenary Sessions of the 16th Party Congress in 
2004 and 2006 and given added weight in the 17th Party Congress in 2007xix.  These terms 
were sufficiently vague to solicit both optimistic and pessimistic expectations about the 
state’s approach to governing society and provided a veil for intra-Party contestation of the 
issue. 
However, developing a professional and effective non-profit civic sector of welfare provision 
proved challenging. First, the regulatory framework for registering social organisations was 
highly restrictive, creating a disabling environment for seeding a civic welfare infrastructure. 
Key limitations related to the corporatist features of regulations such as restrictions on 
expansion which would give economies of scale, the need to identify a government sponsor, 
and the prohibition on forming branchesxx. In addition, the 2010 Foreign Exchange 
Administration regulations put additional constraints on social organisations accessing 
foreign funding. 
Second, there is a deep government suspicion of independent collective action. In particular, 
central Party leaders fear that a more relaxed regulatory framework for civic organisations 
would create openings for oppositional groups to emerge. This deep suspicion gained further 
force after President Putin introduced a highly restrictive NGO law in 2006 as a response to 
his concern that foreign agencies manipulated the Colour Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine 
and Kyrgyzstan through support to local NGOs. In the wake of these Revolutions and 
mounting concern over social unrest, the Chinese Party/state became ever more vigilant about 
monitoring externally funded NGOsxxi. 
Third, intra-state tensions, and in particular between more open-minded officials in the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs, backed indirectly by scholars advocating more space for civil 
society organisations, and public security organs concerned about external threats have been 
                                                          
xix For a detailed account of conceptual shifts see He (2014). 
xx For example, Article 13 stated there could be only one organization for any domain of work in the same 
administrative area.  Article 19 sharply restricted the establishment of branches elsewhere to curb the 
emergence of any competing national political force. Article 3 required all social organizations to identify an 
official sponsoring agency (zhuguan danwei) so as to maintain control. 
xxi At a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in 2005 President Putin reportedly warned President Hu 
Jintao about the potential subversive impact of foreign NGOs (see Shambaugh, 2010:91). 
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a prime factor in stalling progress in amending the registration regulations. Furthermore, both 
sets of institutions have vested interests in increasing their resources and power base. In 2010 
public security agencies enjoyed a substantial boost in budgetary revenue to maintain 
political stability, more than that allocated to defencexxii. 
Two key initiatives in the late Hu-Wen period signalled a serious attempt to craft a new civic 
sector of welfare provision. These were first the experimental adjustment of registration 
regulations for social organisations, initially at a local level, to widen the pool of registered 
social organisations, including previously suspect groups such as labour NGOs. In particular 
certain categories of social organisations could register directly with the Civil Affairs Bureau, 
forgoing the need for a relevant government sponsor (zhuguan danwei主管单位). Scholars 
working on social organisations in China and some officials within the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs had long been advocating for this and other changes in the regulations. Governmental 
departments were wary of sponsoring social organisations unless they were very familiar with 
their staff and work, their risk-averse approach being a significant obstacle to registration. 
The second initiative was the establishment of processes for governmental purchasing of 
welfare services from selected registered social organisations.  
Experimentation with relaxing the registration requirements for selected social organisations 
began in 2008 in Shenzhen, then Beijing and Guangzhou. In 2009 the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs and Guangdong province signed an agreement on promoting reforms in civil affairs, 
including moves towards relaxing registration requirements and outsourcing service 
provisionxxiii.  In 2011 the Civil Affairs Bureau of Guangdong province was already planning 
to relax restrictions on the registration of civil society organisationsxxiv. This scheme came 
into effect from July 2012, enabling these reforms to be extended across the province and 
promoted across China. In the summer of 2012 the Ministry of Civil Affairs released a 
document announcing that certain social organisations such as charities, industrial 
associations and public interest groups could register directly with the relevant level of the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs. In Guangdong the provincial regulations stipulated eight types of 
                                                          
xxii In 2010 the public security budget increased 15 per cent to Y548 billion, more than national defence at Y 
533.5 billion. For the next three years it continued to exceed national defence (see Fosrythe, 2011, Buckley, 
2012 and Blanchard and Ruwitch 2013). 
xxiii See IHLO, 2011b for a useful synopsis of the key policies and regulations adopted from 2006 onwards in 
Guangdong province.  
xxiv See IHLO 2011 a,b.     
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organisationsxxv. Groups engaged in advocacy, rights work or political issues were not 
amongst this list.  
In 2008 the central government selected Shenzhen, Beijing and Guangdong to pioneer the 
second initiative, governmental purchasing of social services from non-profit providers
xxvii
xxvi. 
The Social Affairs Commission to this end allocated specific sums of money for the sub-
contracting of services, either directly to the Ministry of Civil Affairs or through separate 
channels. For example, in 2012 Guangdong provincial government allocated Y466 million in 
2012  for subcontracting services from social organisations .  
Both these innovations marked a serious attempt to change the regulatory environment 
affecting civic organising to draw `social forces’ into providing welfare. To use the metaphor 
of Chen Yun when describing state-market relations, welfarist incorporation allows some 
opening of the cage housing the bird of civil society but only to lure it towards a state agenda. 
On the one hand it is about maintaining the political regime by appeasing migrant workers 
through the provision of welfare services – albeit a politics of interim appeasement that 
remained far from any fundamental restructuring of citizenship rights for migrant workers in 
cities. On the other hand welfarist incorporation has a market logic to appease workers and so 
stabilise capitalist production relations. The next sub-section examines more closely the 
politics of state-labour NGOs relation up till the twist in spring 2012 when the state 
simultaneously courted labour NGOs and as in Guangdong province continued with selective 
harassment.  
II. STATE-LABOUR NGO RELATIONS 1990-2011 
This section examines the contours of state-labour NGOs since the early 1990s, analysing the 
cycles of contention characterised by periods of selective, intense harassment and more 
muted tolerance. Such tolerance was muted in that there was no positive endorsement of 
                                                          
xxv In Guangdong these include industrial associations, trade associations registered in other provinces, 
organisations serving the living of the masses, charitable organisations, social service organisations, rural-
urban grassroots organisations, organisations with a relation/affiliation to foreign organisations and nexus 
organisations. 
xxvi On the background to government procurement see Jia and Su 2009. 
xxvii See The Economist , April 12th 2014, `Chinese Civil Society. Beneath the Glacier’. See  Interviews 24, 64, 71  
13, 14, 15  regarding  labour NGOs receiving  government contracts in Guangdong.. 
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labour NGOs by local state agencies, no `invitation to dance’, a situation that was to change 
from the 2012 onwards, as will be discussed in the next section. 
While business, trade, and professional associations emerged from the early 1980s, it was 
only from the early 1990s that the first labour NGOs appeared. Two factors played a key part 
here. First, the expansion of spaces for civic organising in the run-up to the 1995 Fourth 
World Conference on Women in Beijing facilitated the emergence of labour NGOs. The 
other factor was the extension of the Open Policy throughout the Pearl River Delta in the 
early 1990s and media exposure of poor working conditions and unsafe practices xxviii. It was 
following the horrific fire in Zhili Toy Factory in 1993, in which 87 workers died, that 
scholars, activists and Hong Kong NGOs began to campaign for workers’ rights and set up 
labour NGOs, mainly in Guangdong provincexxix. The regulatory review of social 
organisations between 1997 and 1998 stymied further growth of labour NGOs. By the late 
1990s there were still only a dozen or so labour NGOs, too few in number, reach and 
resources to have much impact.  
WTO entry in 2002 deepened China’s insertion into global production systems. Continuing 
reports of serious labour rights violations along with an expansion of civic organising 
stimulated a further growth of labour NGOs
xxxii
xxxiii
xxxiv. Though largely 
xxx. As most labour organisations are not 
registered, some operate underground and others close down due to lack of funding or 
government pressure, it is impossible without a formal registration system registration to 
accurately estimate their numberxxxi. Interviews  and documentary sources estimate 
anywhere from 40 to 100 labour NGOs in China, figures varying according to definitions 
used and information available . In this study, one quarter of the labour NGOs were 
founded in the 1990s, the remainder being formed since 2001
                                                          
xxviii Chan 2001. 
xxix Chan 2012. 
xxx Howell 2003. 
xxxi Ford (2006: 181) recounts a similar issue in Indonesia.   
xxxii Interview 74, labour NGO, Hong Kong, 29.08.011; interview 58, labour academic, Beijing, 20.07.2011. 
xxxiii  Without a register of labour NGOs, figures are never entirely accurate and vary too according to empirical 
referents included. Interviewees gave estimates from 30 in the Pearl River Delta (Interview 69, labour 
NGO, Shenzhen26.08.2011), 50 (Interview 75, labour NGO, Hong Kong, 29.08.2011)  to 100 in all China 
(Interview 58, labour academic, Beijing, 20.7.2011). See also Xu 2013. 
xxxiv 17 were founded between 2000 and 2010 and four between 2010 and 2012.    
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concentrated in Guangdong province and Beijing
xxxvi. This spread points to the increasing resignation of local governments to the 
survival capacities of labour NGOs (Cheng, Ngok and Zhuang, 2010) 
xxxv, labour NGOs have spread since the 
millennium to other cities such as Suzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Chongqing, Wuhan, Yantai 
and Qingdao
and growing 
recognition of their role in addressing migrant workers’ issues.  
Nevertheless state-NGO relations have been characterised by periods of harassment and 
muted tolerance. For public security agencies labour NGOs are sensitive organisations that 
need careful watching. There are four issues that are of particular concern. First, China has a 
long established trade union, the ACFTU, that is supposed to represent workers and forms a 
key pillar of Party structure (Pringle and Clarke 2010, Taylor and Qi). For TU officials, 
labour NGOs present a symbolic threat to their legitimacy.  Second, independent worker 
mobilisation, labour NGOs or co-ordinated strike action conjure up images of the Polish 
Solidarity movement and thus potential regime threat (Wilson 19990). The third issue 
concerns the need to provide a favourable environment for capitalist production. Hence, 
collective action that impinges on production often triggers a harsh response from local 
public security agencies.  The final concern revolves around the perceived influence of 
`hostile foreign forces’. Labour NGOs with connections to Hong Kong labour groups or 
supported by foreign funding arouse particular suspicion.  
It is only in relation to the fourth issue that there is some possible substance to the 
perceptions of public security agencies. Most labour NGOs rely on external funding from 
foreign foundations, international NGOs, embassies to support activities and core costsxxxvii
xxxviii. Most labour NGOs, however, rely on more limited funding, 
both in terms of sources and amount. Hong Kong labour NGOs have played a key role in 
fostering labour NGOs in China, particularly in Guangdong province, and have approached 
. 
In the office of one Beijing labour NGO established by a former worker, the walls were 
adorned with photos of foreign visitors, international newspaper cuttings and the logos of 
international organisations
                                                          
xxxv Xi 2013:246. 
xxxvi Labour NGOs for this study were located in Beijing, Guangdong, Chongqing, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and 
Shanghai. Tilly et al (2013: 104) estimate there to be 6 in the Yangtze River Delta to in 2012; our own 
research found 10. 
xxxvii There is a very small minority who ostensibly refuse external funding, Renjian being a case in point 
(Interview 35, Beijing, 23.07.2012). 
xxxviii Interview 28, labour NGO, Beijing, 17.07.2012. 
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this work with considerable commitmentxxxix. In particular they have been pivotal in 
mentoring NGO staff, providing organisational, strategic, tactical and analytic advice, 
building dormitory- and factory-based networks, importing frames and discourses, and 
creating opportunities to link with international labour movementsxl.  Foreign foundations 
have also been central in stimulating the emergence of university-based legal clinics, 
providing legal advice to migrant workers and assisting them with legal cases.  
It is the perceived risk they pose to national security and regime maintenance that drives 
periodic state harassment of labour NGOs. Such harassment has ranged from impromptu 
inspection visits to cutting off utility supplies, eviction and outright brutality, often through 
third parties, the chilling attack on the founder, Huang Qingnan, of a Guangdong labour NGO 
in November 2007 being a case in pointxli.  Employers and local state officials eager to 
achieve growth targets often collude in such harassment.  However, not all labour NGOs are 
targeted in the same way, more severe forms of harassment being reserved for groups that 
local state officials particularly fear, either because of external links or ideologically driven 
activism. The extent of harassment has also varied regionally, being reportedly more 
prevalent in Guangdong province, not least because of the concentration of foreign 
investment.  
In general labour NGOs have managed to survive, not just because they have adroitly re-
invented themselves and sought new premises, but also because local Party leaders, 
especially in Guangdong province have come to recognise that it is impossible to stop their 
operations through prohibition or the corporatist regulatory framework. To give but one 
example, a legal assistance labour NGO in Shenzhen founded by a former worker has 
repeatedly re-opened in another location
xliii. Thus, the state’s 
approach to labour NGOs has subtly shifted as government security officials have realised 
xlii.  Furthermore, the Chinese Party/state has been 
careful in recent years not to completely close down labour NGOs for fear of international 
pressure. One recent example was the campaign led by the founder of a school for migrant 
workers’ children in Beijing, who thwarted local county government attempts to close the 
school by mobilising support from parents, academics and donors
                                                          
xxxix See Chan (2012) for a detailed study of the impact of Hong Kong labour NGOs on China. 
xl Chan 2012; Friedman 2009. 
xli Interview 75, labour NGO, Hong Kong, 29.08.2011. 
xlii Interview 69, labour NGO, Shenzhen, 26.08.2011.  
xliii Interview, 81, labour NGO, Hong Kong, 09.12.2013 and interview 85, NGO, Beijing, 10.04.2014. 
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they cannot completely prohibit labour NGOs and as civil affairs officials have grown 
increasingly aware of the benefits that labour NGOs can bring in maintaining social order and 
providing services. 
Paradoxically though, labour NGOs in China are hardly creatures about to foment revolution 
and seize the barricades. Most are too small in scale and number, too distant from workers, 
too focussed on meeting perceived practical needs such as service provision rather than 
strategic needs such as collective empowerment
xlvii
xliv. Furthermore, given the emphasis in 
Chinese labour law on individual rather than collective rightsxlv, most labour NGOs funnel 
workers towards individualised solutions to what are essentially structural problems of power 
in the workplacexlvi. As Friedman and Lee (2010: 515) suggest, they are part of the `rule by 
law’ jigsaw that fosters bureaucratic and judicial means for addressing conflict, propping up 
an authoritarian, market-oriented system rather than undermining it through collective 
action .  
Such criticism is, however, perhaps overly harsh given the severe political constraints facing 
labour NGOs. As Xu (2013: 250) notes, it does not give full credit to the contribution of 
NGOs engaged in legal awareness training and fostering organisational skills amongst 
workers. Nor does it acknowledge the more strategic work done by some labour NGOs, 
particularly those with links to Hong Kong, that are involved in campaigning, research and 
advocacy, even though their impact is limitedxlviii. It thus fails to situate labour NGOs within 
a broader, historical framework around the potential of building a labour movementxlix. 
The majority of labour NGOs in this study, excepting underground organisations or those 
linked to Hong Kong labour NGOs, do not have a broader ideological vision of social change 
based on structural power, let alone a strategic implementation plan. Rather, they focus on 
less ambitious, `within-system’ goals such as defending individual labour rights or providing 
                                                          
xliv Molyneux 1985. 
xlv Chen 2007:63. 
xlvi Lee and Shen, 2011; Xu 2013. 
xlvii Lee and Shen 2011 and Froissart 2011. 
xlviii Froissart 2011. 
xlix See Xu 2013: 24. Also Ford (2006) argues persuasively that labour NGOs are more than substitutes for 
unions and have a longer-term role in the labour movement.  
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services to migrant workers, not just because of political constraintsl but also lack of strategy.  
There is a minority of more professionalised labour NGOs with off-shoots across the 
countryli that have been particularly adept at fund-raising. However, these are also the least 
likely to promote wider structural change. Few make links between labour rights violations in 
the workplace and the broader social exclusion of migrant workers that hinges on the divisive 
ascribed residency systemlii. Nor do the majority engage with workers striking or 
demonstratingliii, whether in initiating these or advising workers on organisation and 
leadership.  With the recent shift towards collective `consultation’, a small minority are now 
planning to work in support of collective bargaining processesliv.  
These periods of harassment are punctuated by periods of muted tolerance as other parts of 
the Party/state view labour NGOs and civil society organisations through a more instrumental 
and measured lens. In particular, those parts of the state concerned with occupational health 
and safety, social welfare and community-level governance are more ready to tolerate labour 
NGOs, which they see as filling a yawning gap in service provision. For local trade unions, 
with limited personnel and fundinglv, labour NGOs with networks of sympathetic lawyers can 
assist with cases that are not easily winnablelvi. Lacking capacity, Dongguan Trade Union 
contracted a labour NGO to organise activities for workers and their childrenlvii. Shenzhen 
Federation of Trade Unions has absorbed labour NGO staff to work in its legal service 
                                                          
l The ACFTU faces similar political constraints, though as Chen (2004) argues, its positioning as a state agency 
gives it greater leverage to influence policy. 
li Article 19 in the regulations on the management of social organisations prohibits the establishment of branch 
organisations. To circumvent this, in the last five years some larger labour NGOs have established off-shoots 
that register independently as enterprises or operate without registration.  
lii Regarding the distinctiveness of the proletarianisation process in China due to the institutionalised rural-
urban divide, see Pun  and Lu, 2010. See Froissart (2011: 2) for an initiative on welfare rights for migrants by 
several Guangdong-based and Hong Kong NGOs.  
liii See Friedman (2009: 200) on strikers consulting with labour NGOs in Shenzhen and Xu (2013: 252) on the 
reluctance of labour NGOs to undertake collective action. 
liv A Guangdong labour NGO is already planning to support collective bargaining processes. Some Hong Kong 
labour NGOs are also extending activities in this field.  
lvFor example, Shanghai General Trade Union’s Legal Advice Centre had  only six full-time staff, hence its 
reliance on a network of sympathetic legal professionals (Chen 2004:35) 
lvi Interview 2, labour  NGO, Nanjing, September 2012; interview 39, labour NGO, Guangzhou, 24.05.2012. 
lvii Interview  24, labour NGO, Guangzhou, 10.07.2012. 
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centres (Xu 2013: 255).  Nonetheless, given the restrictive registration requirements, Civil 
Affairs Bureaus were not able before 2012 to engage systematically with labour NGOs 
because of their lack of legal status as social organisations. Thus, it is the concerns of public 
security agencies and the ACFTU that have tended to prevail in directing state strategy 
towards labour NGOs.  
While local government officials approach labour NGOs with considerable caution but also 
awareness of mutual interests, labour NGOs too seek a variety of relations with the statelviii
lxiii
.  
Establishing a relation with the state can lend legitimacy to an organisation and provide 
protection, allowing the organisation to conduct activities with minimal interferencelix. Some 
labour NGOs studiously ensure that their rhetoric mirrors the slogans of Party leaders and 
provide advice within the law, thereby ensuring their credibility with the local governmentlx. 
Enjoying a positive relationship with the state can provide access to resources such as an 
office or opportunities to access officials through training activitieslxi.  A small minority of 
labour NGOs in this study have close relations with government authorities and the local 
Trade Unions. For example, a Chongqing NGO set up by a severely injured Zhili factory 
worker maintains close relations with the local government, which uses its materials for 
training. Not only have the local and national governments given her several awards, but she 
has also become a member of the local People’s Political Consultative Committeelxii. This 
contrasts with the case of a former worker in Shenzhen who initially set up a migrant 
workers’ association, then a legal counselling service for workers and who later stood as an 
independent, local People’s Congress candidate. He was harassed repeatedly by the local 
authorities and eventually withdrew his candidature .  
Labour NGOs also seek access to the state to influence policy. In 2008 various Guangdong 
labour NGOs seized the opportunity to participate in a conference organised by Shenzhen TU 
                                                          
lviii Hildebrandt 2011. 
lix Interview, 24, labour NGO, Guangzhou, 10.07.2012; interview 34, labour NGO, Beijing, 23.07.2012; interview 
14, labour NGO, Beijing, 30.06.2012; see also He (2008: 15) on Little Bird’s tactics of cultivating personal ties 
with government agencies to gain legitimacy and protection. 
lx He 2008:15. 
lxi Ahmed and Potter, 2006; White et al, 1996. 
lxii Interview 8, labour NGO, Chongqing, September 2012. 
lxiii Interview 69, labour NGO, 26.02.2011 
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to discuss the drafting of detailed implementation regulations for the Labour Contract Lawlxiv. 
Similarly, Guangdong-based labour NGOs submitted suggestions in the consultation process 
around the draft Social Insurance Law that was finally issued in late 2010lxv. Whilst some 
labour NGOs have maintained friendly, informal relations with the local TU, others have 
sought in vain to establish such ties.lxvi Such informal channels of contact acquire particular 
importance when the lack of registration as a social organisation precludes any formal 
relation with the state.  
Nevertheless, most labour NGOs have studiously avoided any activity that might attract the 
negative attention of local authorities. As a senior staff member of one relatively 
professionalised labour NGO commented in relation to its new Shanghai office: “If you start 
talking about labour rights, the government will consider you to be sensitive.”  Similarly a 
staff member in a Hangzhou labour NGO stated, “It seems to me that defending rights too 
much is like fighting to the end and probably there won’t be any quality outcome. I have seen 
that in the Pearl Delta, all their defending rights work has not come to much and when there 
is a crisis, not many people stand by them”lxvii
lxviii
. Or, as another Beijing labour NGO described: 
“There is no clear regulation saying that you can’t work on rights. From the government’s 
perspective they want some people to raise the awareness of workers because then they can 
resolve quite a few things through the law but they don’t want you to do that to the point 
where workers might get too strong and start striking and foreigners would see this and see 
that social order was disturbed “. A small number with close links to concerned academics 
and professionals or external labour NGOs take greater risks, however, to build a democratic 
labour movement through consciousness-raising, leadership building and worker education.  
Up to 2012 state-labour NGO relations have been subject to cycles of contention, with 
periods of selective harassment punctuated by periods of muted tolerance. Though some 
labour NGOs and community, city or provincial level governments were able to establish 
some very limited forms of co-operation, the disabling regulatory framework and prevailing 
security concerns stymied systematic formal co-operation. The next section examines the 
politics underlying the curious twist in this saga as the state `invites labour NGOs to dance’. 
                                                          
lxiv Interview 70, labour NGO, Shenzhen, 26.08.2011. 
lxv Froissart 2011: 2-3. 
lxvi Interview 70, labour NGO, Shenzhen, 26.08.2011; Interview 13, labour NGO, Dongguan, 29.06.2012. 
lxvii Interview 5, labour NGO, September 2012, Hangzhou. 
lxviii Interview 83, labour NGO, Beijing,  02.04.2014. 
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Though by no means signalling an end to repression, it does point to an important shift in 
state strategy. 
III. LET’S DANCE  
The pattern of cyclical harassment and muted tolerance characterising state-labour NGO 
relations took an interesting twist in 2012. The provincial trade union of Guangdong 
province, with the strong backing of then provincial Party Secretary, Wang Yang, began in 
2012 to prepare for the formation of a hub-style federation of social forces concerned with 
migrant workers. In April it convened a seminar to set up such a federation, inviting experts, 
academics and labour NGOs. The following month the Guangdong provincial Trade Union 
called a meeting of academics, lawyers, labour NGOs to establish the Federation of Social 
Service Organisations for Guangdong Workerslxix.  In June it ran training courses for senior 
trade union officials in Peking University and for county level trade union chairs at the China 
Labour College, thereby firmly institutionalising the policylxx. The Federation has 89 
members, including 34 labour NGOs and TU service centres, 55 individual members such as 
academics, lawyers and journalists and TU officers. Its aims are to foster the capacity of 
labour NGOs to provide labour and legal services to migrant workerslxxi, leaving the TU to 
undertake core functions such as representing workers in collective negotiation. Members of 
the Federation can access government and TU-funded labour service projects, participate in 
the mediation of labour disputes, and promote corporate social responsibility. To this end 
TUs have been allocated specific sums of money for the purpose of sub-contracting services.  
Already in the summer of July 2011 Guangdong province Trade Union had started to make 
informal overtures to selected labour NGOs to co-operate in service provision. The following 
summer, the Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau commissioned a professional Beijing-based labour 
NGO to organise a meeting of labour NGOs in Nanjing to encourage them to apply for 
government service contracts related to migrant workers, with reportedly around twenty 
labour NGOs invited. Though prior to this a few labour NGOs were already co-operating 
with local TUs in providing services, mainly at community levellxxii, this meeting was 
                                                          
lxix Interview 39, labour NGO, Guangzhou, 24.05.2012; and IHLO May 2012a 
lxx Lin 2012. 
lxxi IHLO 2012a. 
lxxii Interview  24, labour NGO, Guangzhou, 10.07.2012.  
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significant as it signalled a systematic shift in approach to labour NGOs, one that went 
beyond muted tolerance to active and productive welfarist incorporation.  
Under the firm leadership of Wang Yang in the run-up to the 18th Party Congress, TU leaders 
felt under pressure to demonstrate a more active role in protecting workers, especially given 
the wave of strikes in 2010 in Guangdong. As one labour academic commented, “If the TU is 
talking about service purchasing, then this is not because they want to listen to more voices, 
but because they are responding to a local government call about doing this more. They have 
to be seen to be doing something”lxxiii. The TU sought through this hub to sub-contract 
service provision to labour NGOs. However this did not extend to rights advocacy or 
collective bargaining but focused on more seemingly apolitical activities like legal awareness, 
training in life-skills, and organising cultural activities.  
It was also a way of putting competitive pressure on the TUs to improve their performance. 
The ACFTU has consistently prevented the formation of any `second trade unions’lxxiv, 
stamping down on attempts to unionise outside of its orbit and more recently incorporating 
newly formed associations, such as the Domestic Workers’ Association in Xian.  However, 
the Party/state has cajoled the ACFTU to be more active in defending workers’ rights, as part 
of a more general effort to reform mass organisations, which the Party increasingly sees as 
burdensome and ineffective (Chu 2014). In this spirit not just the ACFTU but also other mass 
organisations like the Guangzhou City and Shenzhen Communist Youth Leagues and 
Women’s Federation formed parallel `hub’ (shu niu 枢紐) federations, incorporating many 
unregistered groups under their leadershiplxxv.   
However, whilst Guangdong government was on the one hand pushing for active co-
operation with selected labour NGOs, it was on the other hand also clamping down on certain 
labour NGOs in the region from February 2012 onwards. Concerns about `hostile forces’ 
both internal and external, were a key driver behind the simultaneity of the invitation to dance 
alongside the clampdown on certain labour NGOs. Already in 2007 governmental pressure 
was being placed on labour NGOs, when eight government departments of Shenzhen 
                                                          
lxxiii Interview 42, labour academic, Guangzhou, 28.05.2012. 
lxxiv Pringle and Clarke, 2011: 64; Howell, 2009: 186–189 
lxxv The Guangdong Hub for care of women and children, established May 2012, had 3,628 registered and 
unregistered grassroots organisations under its leadership (Li and Lin, 2012). 
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government prohibited labour NGOs from acting as legal representatives for workerslxxvi. As 
Friedman and Lee (2010: 534) and Xu (2013: 254) reveal, an internal report by the 
Guangdong Communist Party Committee’s Law and Politics Committee released in early 
January 2009 castigated some rights
lxxvii
-protection labour NGOs as `collecting negative 
information on our labour and legal issues’ and receiving funds from `foreign anti-Chinese 
forces’ as part of a larger plot to `attack our labour system’. In June 2012 the head of Jieyang 
City TU, Guangdong Province, made explicit reference in a speech to the emergence of 
`migrant workers’ associations and people’s trade unions (minjian gonghui 民间工会), all of 
which were cast as evidence of hostile forces operating to destabilise China. As he stated: 
“People’s social organisations are an important front of internal and external hostile forces 
plotting to Westernise and split China” .  
Although this contradictory behaviour at first sight might suggest that this was just yet 
another swing in the cycle of repression and relaxation, the formulation of new local 
regulations marks a formal, significant shift in the state’s approach to labour NGOs. Puzzled 
by the contradictory moves by leaders in Guangdong province, several labour activists and 
scholars speculated that these might reflect internal conflicts between provincial and local 
levels in Guangdong province that then accounted for more repressive measures in some 
cities such as Shenzhen, or that this was a ruse to bring quasi-hidden labour NGOs to the 
surface, creating a wedge between those NGOs that co-operated and those that did notlxxviii.  
The responses of labour NGOs to this new approach have been mixed. Some NGOs have 
gladly seized the opportunity to stabilise their funding base, secure their legal status and gain 
legitimacy and protection. Some have been particularly successful in acquiring contracts, 
whilst others have not been able to register, partly because local-level officials were unaware 
of the changes in regulations or because they were unfamiliar with the group and thus 
unwilling to take a risk. The Civil Affairs Bureau in Beijing, for example, awarded one 
professionalised labour NGO, with whose work it was well acquainted, two projects in 2011, 
for the sums of Y30,000 and Y50,000 respectively, accounting for one third of their funding 
                                                          
lxxvi Xu 2013: 254. 
lxxvii See `Guangdong sheng Jieyang city TU: people’s social organisations and the TU’, 27.06.2012, speech, 
accessed on www.gdp ftu.org.cn on 02.02.2014. See also Document 9 circulated by the CCP Central 
Committee, April 22nd 2013. 
lxxviii Interviews 17, 20, 21, 22, 37, 38, 41, 44.  
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that year, to organise activities for migrants and health checks for their childrenlxxix. In 2012 
Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau awarded them another contract on the health issues of workers’ 
children, again work for which they had previously established a reputation. One of the first 
labour organisations in Beijing to organise around female migrant workers and more recently 
domestic workers has also secured community-level government contracts for the care of the 
elderly, a relatively new activity entrusted to them on the basis of their previous work in 
training domestic workerslxxx.  
Not all labour NGOs have been able to register, however. For example, the Shenzhen-based 
Hand in Hand NGO encountered several problems such as not being able to gain the street 
committee’s approval as officials were not familiar with it. After another attempt at city-level 
it failed again because the defined scope of business did not fit the criteria. In contrast the 
Blue Workers’ Co-operative, due reportedly to support from respected professionals and 
advice given to use a different name, namely, Good Citizens’ Social Work Services Centre, 
were finally able to registerlxxxi.   
But for some labour NGOs cosying up to government is seen as risky, potentially 
undermining their autonomy and compromising goals and activities. Some NGOs that are 
more ideologically inclined have no interest in tendering for government contracts, even if 
this would potentially give them greater financial stability. Labour NGOs that are not invited 
to dance or do not have the capacity to meet the requirements of procurement contracts risk 
remaining in a legal limbo, ever vulnerable to intermittent harassment. There are also labour 
NGOs that local governments would definitely not invite to co-operate. According to a 
Beijing City TU official, certain labour NGOs are on a `blacklist’ of `sensitive’ organisations, 
whilst NGOs relying for all their funding from foreign sources would not be invited to apply, 
on grounds that foreign agencies have ulterior motives in Chinalxxxii.  
Whilst it is too early to assess the effects on labour NGOs of `dancing with government’, 
there are already some indications that co-operation is leading NGOs to limit their activities 
to safe agendas and to become more adjutants of the government rather than of workers. For 
example, a labour NGO began in 2012 to sub-contract with the local TU in Beijing to provide 
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cultural services such as organising dances to construction workers. When asked whether 
they would still assist workers with disputes over salaries or industrial injury, its founder 
explained that, “This is a service purchasing contract. There is a line that cannot be crossed, 
and to do so would be dangerouslxxxiii”. Similarly, Donguan city TU in March 201
lxxxiv
lxxxv. The interviewee described this as doing `enterprise social work', 
reflecting the underlying goal of appeasement and conflict avoidance. 
1 
contracted with a labour NGO to carry out some of its functions, as their staff were all part-
time. The labour NGO, which draws 90 per cent of its funding from government contracts, 
operated from within the factory to organise activities for workers’ wives and children, set up 
worker’s choirs and arrange lectures on occupational health and safety. While the NGO 
benefited from the revenue, the arrangement steered them into cultural activities rather than 
strategic work around rights and power relations.  In another case a labour NGO in 
Shenzhen subcontracted directly with a TNC to run a hot-line for workers, with plans to 
extend this to Shanghai
 
In some cases labour NGOs have been contracted to provide services to groups other than 
workers, such as the elderly, thus potentially deflecting them from their original missions. As 
one interviewee in a Beijing labour NGO stated, “I feel we are moving away from our goals. 
…As [foreign money] dries up, we will move more and more away from our original goals. 
But we haven’t lost these goals altogether. We still have voluntary hotlines and we still have 
lawyers who work with us so we can still do this work with migrants. We haven’t forgotten it 
or lost it”. Indeed, this organisation had already devised a way of continuing with its original 
goals by running parallel organisations with separate registration statuses, enabling it to 
access both domestic and foreign funds.  
Labour NGOs engaged in governmental service provision are unlikely to be agencies of 
social change empowering workers to organise collectively, challenging government 
employment policies or consciously building a labour movement. Whilst labour NGOs with a 
more strategic agenda seek to foster a labour movement through collective action, labour 
NGOs that come to rely on government funding function effectively as part of a system of 
welfarist incorporation containing worker dissent rather than empowering workers and 
ultimately stabilising rather than challenging capitalist relations of production. This is not to 
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dismiss the work of labour NGOs, nor to deny their potential to become future agencies of 
change, but to distinguish as one labour activist stated between `doing NGO work and doing 
movement work’lxxxvi. Indeed as a result of the harassment in 2012 some labour NGOs have 
been reviewing their approach and turning towards a more movement practice that focuses on 
supporting lxxxvii local workers’ groups .  
 CONCLUSION 
This article sought to explain the shift in the Party/state’s approach to labour NGOs in 2012. 
Specifically, it argued that the Party/state’s `invitation to dance’ with labour NGOs reflected 
a broader strategy of welfarist incorporation aimed at re-working the social contract between 
the state and labour. This broader strategy has both a state logic of maintaining social control 
and a market logic of stabilising capitalist production. This strategy required two key 
adjustments: first, the relaxation of registration regulations for specific social organisations; 
and second, the creation of a civic infrastructure for governmental sub-contracting of social 
services. Aware of the services that labour NGOs provided to migrant workers, relevant 
government departments and local Trades Unions sought pro-actively to draw selected labour 
NGOs into welfare-focussed co-operation. In this way they could incorporate labour NGOs in 
a qualitatively different way into the political system, stymie their radical edge by 
emphasising services to the exclusion of rights, and wean them off external funding.  
Whilst the simultaneous repression of labour NGOs in Guangdong province in the summer of 
2012 might seem to contradict the intentions of the invitation to dance, it suggests that this 
shift does not spell the end of harassment. Labour NGOs have responded in various ways to 
this invitation to dance, some seizing the opportunity to access resources, legitimacy and 
influence, others treading more cautiously, and some refusing to dance. However, these 
moves to refashion the welfare contract raise thorny practical and strategic issues. At the 
practical level the relative newness of welfare-oriented NGOs means that there are 
considerable problems of capacity, scale and governance. With contracts signed on a one or 
two year basis in general, there are serious issues of sustainability both for organisational 
development and welfare provision. Labour NGOs face additional constraints in becoming 
effective, namely the structural problems of a large, shifting worker population, access to 
factories, and continuing governmental suspicion.  Furthermore, the subsumption of labour 
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NGOs under a TU-led Federation might be the death-kiss of labour activism, as labour NGOs 
get embroiled in providing services rather than engaging in strategic agendas.  
Even if labour NGOs do achieve the tasks laid out in government contracts, it is unlikely that 
their activities will make a significant difference to workers’ situation and to the development 
of a labour movement. In the end ameliorating workers’ situation depends crucially on 
empowering workers to articulate demands and negotiate with the state and capital. Most 
historical struggles for improved working conditions and rights have built on concerted 
pressure from below, involving an organised workers’ movement and other progressive 
forces.  
There is a broader issue of whether a new social contract can ensure a decent bottom-line of 
working conditions, dampen worker protest and maintain social order. Though central Party 
leaders have been discussing universalising social welfare and removing the residence permit 
system, these changes will take time and will no doubt vary regionally. Sub-contracting 
labour NGOs to provide services is an interim measure in this hiatus, pending other systemic 
reforms for completing the refashioning of the social contract. Much will depend not just on 
the responses of labour NGOs but also on the willingness of Chinese workers to accept 
economistic improvements in lieu of political rights to organise. As for the future of labour 
NGOs, the current state overtures are both an opportunity to gain new funding and legitimacy 
from the state but also a subtle means to separate the `chaff from the wheat’ and to dampen 
the prospects of independent labour organising. It is welfarist incorporation de rigeur and 
repression by stealth.  
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